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The International Turn in Intellectual History† 
 
DAVID ARMITAGE 
Department of History, Harvard University 
 
… ideas are the most migratory things in the world.1 
 
On croit souvent que la vie intellectuelle est spontanément internationale.  
Rien n’est plus faux.2 
 
For most of the life-span of the historical profession, in most parts of the world, 
historians were committed to methodological nationalism. Like most other social 
scientists, they assumed that self-identifying nations, organized politically into states, 
were the primary objects of historical study.3 Their main tasks were accordingly to 
narrate how nation-states emerged, how they developed, and how they interacted with 
one another. Even those historians whose work deliberately crossed the borders of 
national histories worked along similar lines. For example, diplomatic historians used 
national archives to reconstruct relations among states. Historians of immigration tracked 
the arrival and assimilation of new peoples into existing states.4 And imperial historians 
studied empires as the extensions of national histories, even though they generally 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
† Forthcoming in Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn, eds., Rethinking Modern European 
Intellectual History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). For their comments on earlier 
versions of this chapter, I am especially grateful to Alexander Bevilacqua, Philip Fileri, and Mira 
Siegelberg, to participants in a Radcliffe Exploratory Seminar at Harvard University, and to 
audiences in Helsinki, London, and Princeton. 
1 Arthur O. Lovejoy, ‘Reflections on the History of Ideas,’ Journal of the History of Ideas 1 
(1940): 4. 
2 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘Les conditions sociales de la circulation internationale des idées,’ 
Romanistische Zeitschrift für Literaturgeschichte/Cahiers d’Histoire des Littératures Romanes 14 
(1990): 2. 
3 ‘… a nation is a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its 
own; hence, a nation is a community which normally tends to produce a state of its own’: Max 
Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, new edn. 
(London: Routledge, 1991), 176. 
4 Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, ‘Methodological Nationalism, the Social Sciences, 
and the Study of Migration: An Essay in Historical Epistemology,’ International Migration 
Review 37 (2003): 576-610. 
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maintained a strict separation between the histories of metropolitan states (mostly in 
Europe) and their colonies (mostly outside Europe). In all these fields, the matter of 
history concerned stability not mobility, what was fixed but not what was mixed. 
Historians in all fields have more recently been moving towards studies they 
describe variously as international, transnational, comparative, and global. Their efforts 
have not been identical in scope, in subject matter, or in motivation, nor is there any 
consensus on how these non-national approaches to history should be distinguished from 
each other. International historians often take for granted the existence of a society of 
states but look beyond state boundaries to map inter-state relationships, from diplomacy 
and finance to migration and cultural exchanges. Transnational historians examine 
processes, movements, and institutions that overflow territorial boundaries: for example, 
the environment, organized crime, epidemics, corporations, religions, and international 
social movements. Comparative historians deal with distinct historical subjects—which 
are often, but not always, nationally defined—in conjunction with each, although not 
always on the basis of any actual historical connection between their objects of study. 
And global historians treat the history and pre-histories of globalization, the histories of 
objects that have become universalized, and the links between sub-global arenas such as 
the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans. The family resemblance that links these 
approaches is the desire to go above or beyond the histories of states defined by nations 
and of nations bounded by states. Taken together, these projects comprise what the 
international turn in historical writing.5 
This international turn represents perhaps the most transformative 
historiographical movement since the rise of social history in the 1960s and the linguistic 
turn of the 1970s.6 Why it has taken place simultaneously across so many areas of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Patricia Clavin, ‘Defining Transnationalism,’ Contemporary European History 14 (2005): 421-
39; C. A. Bayly, Sven Beckert, Matthew Connelly, Isabel Hofmeyr, Wendy Kozol, and Patricia 
Seed, ‘AHR Conversation: On Transnational History,’ American Historical Review 111 (2006): 
1441-64; Pierre-Yves Saunier, ‘Transnational,’ in Akira Iriye and Pierre-Yves Saunier, eds., The 
Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 1047-
55. 
6 For a broader discussion of recent ‘turns’ in historical writing see Judith Surkis, Gary Wilder, 
James W. Cook, Durba Ghosh, Julia Adeney Thomas, and Nathan Perl-Rosenthal, ‘AHR Forum: 
Historiographic “Turns” in Critical Perspective,’ American Historical Review 117 (2012): 698-
813. 
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historical work would be a good question for intellectual history. However, it poses a 
particular problem for intellectual historians, who have so far written little about the 
international turn. This absence of engagement can be attributed in part to the reigning 
materialism of many of the strains of history that comprise the international turn in their 
field. Historians of capital, empire, and migration, alongside sociologists and 
archaeologists with global ambitions, have led debate on this movement and produced 
many of the major works of synthesis. For such historians, ‘each age gets the thought it 
needs’—Buddhism; Christianity; Islam: it’s all the same really.7 To them, intellectual 
history has seemed immaterial in both senses of that term: a kind of history from the neck 
up dealing with the insubstantial imaginings of disembodied beings from inner space. A 
major challenge for intellectual historians is how to combat this skepticism without 
succumbing to reductionism or dissolving the identity of their field. In this case, the best 
way to go forwards may be to look backwards, to the roots of intellectual history itself in 
the period before historiography had been adopted as a handmaiden of national states. 
Intellectual history can justifiably claim to have been international history avant 
la lettre. As Donald Kelley has shown, the first practitioners of the history of ideas, from 
Thomas Stanley in mid-seventeenth-century England to Victor Cousin in post-
Napoleonic France, produced works that were strikingly cosmopolitan in character and 
content. Their histories sprang from traditions of philosophical eclecticism stretching 
back to Diogenes Laertius but arose most immediately from early-modern 
epistemological debates in which ideas were held to be independent of their origins, 
whether national or otherwise.8 These early forms of the history of ideas were 
characteristic products of a Republic of Letters that was self-consciously supranational in 
its affiliations and the nature of its scholarly exchanges. The Respublica literarum 
‘embraces the whole world and is composed of all nationalities, all social classes, all ages 
and both sexes,’ wrote one of its citizens, the French scholar and litterateur Bonaventure 
d’Argonne in 1699: ‘All languages, ancient as well as modern are spoken.’ Within a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ian Morris, Why the West Rules—For Now: The Patterns of History, and What They Reveal 
About the Future (London: Profile Books, 2010), 420, 476, 568, 621. 
8 Donald R. Kelley, The Descent of Ideas: The History of Intellectual History (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2002), chs. 1-2. 
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global community that extended from China to Peru, ‘ideas were colorless, ageless, 
raceless, genderless’—and, it might be added, placeless and stateless.9 
Intellectual history was born international, and it remained so long after the rise of 
nationalism within and beyond the historical profession. The logic of territorial statehood 
marked intellectual history much less than other areas of historical inquiry and it became 
an article of faith among historians of ideas that their objects of attention escaped national 
boundaries. For example, the ‘New History’ pioneered in the late nineteenth-century 
United States by Frederick Jackson Turner and James Harvey Robinson questioned 
nationalist historiography at the moment of its birth and drew inspiration from those 
historical phenomena that evaded its clutches. As Turner noted in 1891, ‘Ideas, 
commodities even, refuse the bounds of a nation. … This is true especially of our modern 
world with its complex commerce and means of intellectual connection.’10 Half a century 
later, the founding father of the modern history of ideas, Arthur O. Lovejoy, might have 
been recalling Turner’s words when he asserted in 1938, ‘Ideas are commodities which 
enter into interstate commerce.’ How those ideas were manufactured and how they 
travelled, who trafficked them and who consumed them, were not questions the classic 
historians of ideas thought to ask: that was a task for specialists in comparative literature, 
‘understood to be the study of international intellectual relations’.11 Only with the rise of 
the social history of ideas and the history of the book would such material concerns 
inform the work of intellectual historians. This new strain of intellectual history also 
proclaimed its internationalism, as a history of livres sans frontières joined a history of 
ideas without borders.12 ‘By their very nature, books refuse to be contained within any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Bonaventure d’Argonne, quoted in Anthony Grafton, ‘A Sketch Map of a Lost Continent: The 
Republic of Letters,’ in Grafton, Worlds Made by Words: Scholarship and Community in the 
Modern West (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009), 9. 
10 Frederick Jackson Turner, ‘The Significance of History’ (1891), in Turner, The Early Writings 
of Frederick Jackson Turner, ed. Everett E. Edwards (Madison: The University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1938), 57; Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the 
American Historical Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 89-95. 
11 Arthur O. Lovejoy, ‘The Historiography of Ideas’ (1938), in Lovejoy, Essays in the History of 
Ideas (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1948), 3, 1. 
12 Leslie Howsam and James Raven, ‘Introduction,’ in Howsam and Raven, eds., Books between 
Europe and the Americas: Connections and Communities, 1620-1860 (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), 1. 
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discipline,’ Robert Darnton argued in 1994: ‘They also refuse to respect national 
boundaries.’13 
Intellectual history’s innate resistance to nationalism may have had the 
paradoxical effect of making it harder for the field to take an international turn in more 
recent years. Because intellectual historians have not needed to reject national categories 
or to embrace cosmopolitan alternatives to them, they might be methodologically 
underprepared for such a movement. Indeed, the international turn has lately come to 
intellectual history by the academic equivalent of technological leapfrogging, as the field 
shifts from the non-national to the supra-national without ever having fully inhabited the 
national frameworks that traditionally structured most professional history-writing.14 This 
move entails facing up to some of the shortcomings of intellectual history as it has 
traditionally been practiced, especially its resistance to considering the spatial dimensions 
of context. And it demands greater insistence on the distinctive contributions intellectual 
history can make more generally to the broader international turn. Nonetheless, as I hope 
to show, intellectual historians possess some of the best available tools for tracing the 
emergence of categories such as the international and the global, for tracking the 
circulation of ideas, and for tackling some of the challenges raised by the international 
turn, among them the dangers of idealism, classism, and presentism, and the challenges 
of redefining context. Intellectual history may therefore have as much to offer the 
international turn as the international turn has to offer to intellectual history. 
 
* * * * * 
 
A few years ago, I suggested that ‘a renaissance in the history of international 
thought’ was beginning that might ‘open up new conversations between historians, 
political theorists, International Relations scholars and international lawyers.’15 That 
renaissance is now well under way and has produced the first fruits of intellectual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Robert Darnton and Krassimira Daskalova, ‘Book History, the State of Play: An Interview with 
Robert Darnton,’ SHARP News 3, 3 (Summer 1994): 2. 
14 Margrit Pernau, ‘Whither Conceptual History? From National to Entangled Histories,’ 
Contributions to the History of Concepts 7 (2012): 1-11. 
15 David Armitage, ‘The Fifty Years’ Rift: Intellectual History and International Relations,’ 
Modern Intellectual History 1 (2004): 108-09. 
- 6 - 
history’s international turn. This revival of the history of international thought marks the 
most recent of three phases of relations between intellectual history and international 
history: an age of engagement that lasted from roughly the end of the First World War 
until the 1950s; an age of estrangement running from the early 1960s to the mid-1990s; 
and an age of rapprochement which is still very much in progress. 
In the initial age of engagement, historians of ideas were often methodologically 
cosmopolitan and politically internationalist in outlook, while historically-minded 
students of International Relations dealt openly in ideas rather than abstract models or 
theories. Thinkers otherwise as diverse as Hannah Arendt, Raymond Aron, Herbert 
Butterfield, Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, Carl Schmitt, Kenneth Waltz, and 
Martin Wight drew upon shared historical canons even though they disagreed profoundly 
over such matters as the ethics of war and peace or the balance between national 
sovereignty and the authority of international institutions.16 
During the succeeding age of estrangement, intellectual historians and 
international historians drew further apart. Disciplinary boundaries hardened and were 
more fiercely defended. The refinement of methodologies and the acceleration of 
professional specialization made conversations between fields less common. The 
separation between the domestic and the international sharpened. ‘Theory’—whether 
political or international—lost ground to positivist models which excluded ideas and 
ethics from the realms of politics and International Relations, particularly in the United 
States. In retrospect, the May 1954 Conference on International Politics convened in New 
York by the Rockefeller Foundation, in which Morgenthau, Niebuhr, and others 
participated, now looks like the high-water mark of an ethical approach to international 
affairs before the triumph of behavioralist social science in the United States.17 
Over the next quarter-century, intellectual historians moved ever further away 
from international historians as a resurgent social history pressed both fields to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Brunello Vigezzi, The British Committee on the Theory of International Politics (1954-1985): 
The Rediscovery of History (Milan: Edizioni Unicopli, 2005). 
17 Martin Wight, ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’ (1959), in Herbert Butterfield and 
Martin Wight, eds., Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics 
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), 17-34; Stanley Hoffman, ‘An American Social Science: 
International Relations,’ Daedalus 106 (1977): 41-60; Nicolas Guilhot, ed., The Invention of 
International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference 
on Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). 
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margins of the historical profession, especially in the United States. What one clerk said 
to another clerk was as unfashionable as what one philosopher wrote about another 
philosopher. As Robert Darnton observed gloomily in a 1980 collection published on 
behalf of the American Historical Association, ‘a malaise is spreading among intellectual 
historians … … after a realignment of research during the last two decades, she now sits 
below the salt.’ In the same volume, Charles Maier offered a similarly downbeat 
assessment of international history: ‘The history of international relations … [has] little 
sense of collective enterprise, of being at the cutting edge of historical scholarship.’18 
As so often, such intimations of obsolescence proved to be spurs to innovation. 
Within little more than a decade, the two fields had begun to converge again. The age of 
rapprochement beginning in the 1990s saw revivals in both intellectual history and 
international history alongside the increasing entanglement of the two fields with each 
other. At least some scholars of International Relations found themselves in a ‘post-
positivist’ phase marked by a renewed interest in theory, in the history of international 
affairs, and in the history of their own discipline. International historians became more 
interested in culture, ideology, and institutions, ‘champions of the international turn as 
well as vigorous proponents of intellectual and cultural history.’ At the same time, 
intellectual historians began to treat historically the norms and interactions between 
peoples, states and other corporate bodies in the world beyond the domestic sphere under 
the rubric of the history of international thought.19 
The term ‘international thought’ was originally an invention of British publicists 
and litterateurs sympathetic to the League of Nations and nascent international 
institutions in the years between the two World Wars. Its original purpose had been to 
denote a usable past rather than to create a critical history.20 It received support from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Robert Darnton, ‘Intellectual History and Cultural History,’ in Michael Kammen, ed., The Past 
Before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1980), 327; Charles Maier, ‘Marking Time: The Historiography of International Relations,’ 
in Kammen, ed., The Past Before Us, 355. 
19 Lucian M. Ashworth, ‘Interdisciplinarity and International Relations,’ European Political 
Science 8 (2009): 16-25; Duncan Bell, ‘Writing the World: Disciplinary History and Beyond,’ 
International Affairs 85 (2009): 3-22; Thomas W. Zeiler, ‘The Diplomatic History Bandwagon: A 
State of the Field,’ Journal of American History 95 (2009): 1053 (quoted). 
20 John Galsworthy, International Thought (Cambridge: Heffers, 1923); F. Melian Stawell, The 
Growth of International Thought (London: T. Butterworth, 1929). On their immediate 
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equally committed internationalists across the Atlantic, notably the American 
international lawyer James Brown Scott, who created the earliest historical canon of 
works of international thought from Balthazar Ayala to Richard Zouche in the series 
sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ‘Classics of International 
Law’ (1911-50).21 The recent revival of the history of international thought has seen it 
emerge as a robust field in its own right, with a more expansive and less teleological 
canon of authors, problems and movements, and not just as a subset of the history of 
political thought.22 International thought now means less a body of authoritative doctrine 
to be deployed for present purposes than the past tense of international thinking as the 
activity of theoretical reflection upon international affairs.  
A humanistic return to the sources of international thought revealed the distance 
between what thinkers like Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, and Immanuel Kant were 
doing—or, just as often, what they were not attempting to do—and the uses made of 
them within later disciplinary histories. Grotius could have had no intention of fathering 
international law. Hobbes was no ‘Hobbesian,’ at least, as far as that term had been used 
as a term of art by students of International Relations. And Kant was rather more than the 
theorist of the ‘democratic peace’ to which he had been reduced by teleological 
internationalists since the early the twentieth century.23 For the twentieth century, we now 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
antecedents, see Casper Sylvest, British Liberal Internationalism, 1880-1930: Making Progress? 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009). 
21 John Hepp, ‘James Brown Scott and the Rise of Public International Law,’ Journal of the 
Gilded Age and Progressive Era 7 (2008): 151-79; Benjamin Allen Coates, ‘Trans-Atlantic 
Advocates: American International Law and U.S. Foreign Relations, 1898-1919’ (unpub. Ph.D. 
thesis, Columbia University, 2010), 101-05. 
22 Edward Keene, International Political Thought: A Historical Introduction (Cambridge: Polity, 
2005); Beate Jahn, ed., Classical Theory in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006); Duncan Bell, ed., Victorian Visions of Global Order: Empire and 
International Relations in Nineteenth-Century Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007); Ian Hall and Lisa Hill, eds., British International Thinkers from Hobbes 
to Namier (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
23 Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order 
from Grotius to Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Martine Julia van Ittersum, Profit 
and Principle: Hugo Grotius, Natural Rights Theories and the Rise of Dutch Power in the East 
Indies, 1595-1615 (Leiden: Brill, 2006); Noel Malcolm, ‘Hobbes's Theory of International 
Relations,’ in Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 432-56; 
Sankar Muthu, Enlightenment Against Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003); 
Eric S. Easley, The War over Perpetual Peace: An Exploration into the History of a Foundational 
International Relations Text (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 
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have historical studies of international thinkers of all stripes from Norman Angell and 
Hannah Arendt to Leonard Woolf and Alfred Zimmern, with an especially vigorous 
cottage industry devoted to the work of Carl Schmitt.24 At the same time, self-critical 
disciplinary historians of International Relations and international law have, for example, 
exposed how a ‘discourse of anarchy’ contingently generated in the inter-War years 
became a timeless truth for the later Realist school of International Relations and have 
shown the complicity of idealistic international lawyers with imperial enterprises from 
the Belgian Congo to the Bay of Pigs.25 
Intellectual historians have been well placed to assist skeptical international 
historians in questioning some of the basic building-blocks of their discipline. For 
example, no date was more foundational for International Relations than 1648 and the 
Peace of Westphalia. The demolition of the ‘myth of 1648’ as the origins of a world of 
mutually recognizing, non-interfering sovereign states was a relatively straightforward 
process. It relied on a reading of the treaties of Munster and Westphalia, the recognition 
that empires, federations and other kinds of layered or divided sovereignty were more 
characteristic of political authority than any alleged ‘Westphalian’ sovereignty, and 
attention to the world beyond northern Europe, to see how little respect was paid to the 
putative sovereignty of many of the world’s peoples under the regime of empire.26 The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 David Long and Peter Wilson, eds., Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis: Inter-War Idealism 
Reassessed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Patricia Owens, Between War and Politics: 
International Relations and the Thought of Hannah Arendt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007); Jeanne Morefield, Covenants without Swords: Idealist Liberalism and the Spirit of Empire 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Louiza Odysseos and Fabio Petito, eds., The 
International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Terror, Liberal War and the Crisis of Global 
Order (London: Routledge, 2007); William Hooker, Carl Schmitt’s International Thought: Order 
and Orientation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Stephen Legg, ed., Spatiality, 
Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt: Geographies of the Nomos (London, 2011). 
25 Brian Schmidt, The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International 
Relations (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998); Martti Koskenniemi, The 
Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870-1960 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
26 Andreas Osiander, ‘Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,’ 
International Organization 55 (2001): 251-87; Benno Teschke The Myth of 1648: Class, 
Geopolitics and the Making of Modern International Relations (London: Verso, 2003); Benjamin 
Straumann, ‘The Peace of Westphalia as a Secular Constitution,’ Constellations 15 (2008): 173–
88; Pärtel Piirimäe, ‘The Westphalian Myth of Sovereignty and the Idea of External Sovereignty,’ 
in Hent Kalmo and Quentin Skinner, eds., Sovereignty in Fragments: The Past, Present and 
Future of a Contested Concept (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 64-80. 
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Westphalian myth had in turn underpinned a set of assumptions that defined modern 
international thought: that states, not individuals, were the primary actors in international 
affairs; that the spheres of the domestic and the foreign, the inside and the outside of the 
state, were distinct and separate; that positive law trumped natural law; that a hierarchical 
standard of civilization applied across the globe; and that the international realm was 
anarchical and hence governed by maxims of reason of state. These fundamental 
assumptions were neither uniform nor uncontested but they did set the terms of debate for 
at least a century and a half.27 
The intellectual history of the international still teems with possibilities for 
research. For example, what were the media for international thought, and how might 
they be understood using the methods of history of the book?28 Starting in the late 
seventeenth century and continuing to the present, new and persistent genres of writing 
and publication, among them treaty-collections, diplomatic manuals, and histories of 
international relations and of the law of nations, proliferated amid the clerical, scholarly 
and humanistic cultures that intersected so often with transnational diplomatic and 
military communities: further examination of such genres might help us to understand, 
among other questions, why Kant cast Zum ewigen Frieden (1795) in the form of a 
treaty.29 What were the novel philosophical personae adopted by casuistical envoys, 
literary-minded administrators, and intellectuals in office in the burgeoning international 
institutions of the eighteenth century and beyond?30 And how was international thought 
itself internationalized? To take just one example, the translation and circulation in Asia 
of a major vector of Henry Wheaton’s Elements of International Law (1836) suggests 	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University Press, 2013). 
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Sophus Reinert, Translating Empire: Emulation and the Origins of Political Economy 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
29 For suggestive work in these directions, see Randall Lesaffer, ed., Peace Treaties and 
International Law in European History: From the Late Middle Ages to World War One 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Daniel Ménager, Diplomatie et théologie à la 
Renaissance (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2001); Ellen M. McClure, Sunspots and the 
Sun King: Sovereignty and Mediation in Seventeenth-century France (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 2006); Timothy Hampton, Fictions of Embassy: Literature and Diplomacy in Early 
Modern Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009). 
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that the assumptions underlying modern international thought were becoming 
increasingly trans-regional, if not yet fully global, by the middle of the nineteenth 
century.31 In this sense, the receptivity of the world to the contagion of sovereignty which 
almost universally affected it still demands explanation, especially by attending to the 
domestic determinants and conditions of its reception and domestication.32 Only then can 
we fully understand the energetic co-production of the national and the international 
around the globe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.33 
The internationalization of the international can also be approached through the 
intellectual history of international institutions. Proponents of the new international 
history have long urged their colleagues to ‘internationalize international history’ by 
studying non-state actors in the international realm: corporations, non-governmental 
organizations, transnational social movements and bodies such as the World Health 
Organization or the United Nations.34 This call has more recently generated new 
opportunities for archival intellectual histories of the Institut de Droit international, the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the League of Nations, UNESCO, and the 
European Union to name only some of the most prominent. Some of this work has been 
internalist and celebratory, notably that generated through the United Nations Intellectual 
History Project, but much of it has helped to expand the range of actors, archives, and 
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institutions open to examination by intellectual historians.35 One product of this 
expansion has been the new history of human rights, a field now in its second wave, as it 
has moved from its teleological phase of telling just-so stories into a more critical 
literature alert to context and to discontinuity.36 
Other subjects of concern to intellectual historians—the history of economic 
thought; conceptions of war and government; public health; and the history of science—
can all be researched in the archives of international institutions, companies, and 
corporations. In this regard, modern intellectual historians can learn from those early 
modernists who have followed historians of science in constructing intellectual histories 
of the English and Dutch trading companies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.37 
The explosion of interest among political theorists and students of ethics in the 
international and global dimensions of their concerns has helped to accelerate all these 
developments, which took place amid an ever-growing public awareness of the 
transnational dimensions of human affairs captured by the catch-all term 
‘globalization’.38 All these movements have in turn encouraged and reinforced internal 
tendencies within intellectual history to reconstruct arguments dealing with matters 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations; Roger-Pol Droit, L'Humanité toujours à 
construire: regard sur l'histoire intellectuelle de l’UNESCO, 1945-2005 (Paris: UNESCO, 2005); 
Glenda Sluga and Sunil Amrith, ‘New Histories of the United Nations,’ Journal of World History 
19 (2008): 251-74; Emma Rothschild, ‘The Archives of Universal History,’ Journal of World 
History 19 (2008): 375-401; Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea 
(London: Allen Lane, 2012); Richard Jolly, Louis Emmerij and Thomas G. Weiss, UN Ideas that 
Changed the World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), and similar works from the 
United Nations Intellectual History Project. 
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beyond the nation or the state that, collectively, I have called the international turn among 
intellectual historians. 
 
* * * * * 
 
 
Space is the final frontier for intellectual history. The international turn has 
revived interest in conceptions of space by attending to arenas that were larger than 
nations, unconfined by the political boundaries of states, and connected by transnational 
linkages and circulations. Most of the world’s population, for most of recorded history, 
lived not in nation-states but in empires, those far-flung, stratified polities that projected 
various kinds of universalism in order to suspend differences among populations without 
striving for uniformity between them. For a relatively brief period, between the early 
sixteenth and early twentieth centuries, some of those empires were the outgrowths of 
confidently national cultures, particularly in Europe and Asia, but most were pre-national 
or supranational in composition. Oceanic spaces connected elements of these empires in 
the modern period, but maritime arenas such as the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the 
Atlantic, and the Pacific also segmented sovereignties and became cockpits of inter-
imperial rivalry.39 In light of the long history of empire, the eternal world of states 
posited by modern conceptions of international relations seems fleeting, even marginal. 
Indeed, if by some estimates a world of true nation-states, detached from empire, 
emerged only with the zenith of decolonization, soon to be swept away by the wave of 
transnationalism that erupted after the end of the Cold War, then the heyday of the state 
lasted less than a generation, from about 1975 to 1989.40 All history, before and after, 
was either pre-national or post-national history. 
By simultaneously uniting and dividing, empires spurred conceptual competition 
and facilitated the circulation of ideas among diasporic peoples and across commercial 	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routes.41 From such collisions and transmissions emerged ‘competing universalisms’ of 
empire, religion, and political economy, for instance, as well as the expansive ideologies 
that countered or subsumed them, such as pan-Islamism, pan-Africanism, nationalism, 
anti-colonialism, and other forms of ‘colored cosmopolitanism’.42 Most of these 
movements were invisible as long as history was viewed through nation-shaped 
spectacles. They returned to view only when older experiences of space—more 
extensive, more fluid, and less confined by territorial boundaries—again framed 
questions about the past. 
The field is rife with spatial metaphors—of ideas as ‘migratory’ and of books 
escaping the bounds of nations; of ‘horizons’ of understanding and the public ‘sphere’; of 
‘localism’ and ‘provincialism’ as determinants of ideas; and conceptions of hermeneutic 
‘containment’ and critical ‘movement,’ for example—but such figures of speech do not 
indicate any substantive engagement so far with questions of space and place. They are 
instead shorthand indications that ideas lack material determinants and that they need to 
be placed into contexts construed almost entirely as temporal and linguistic not physical 
or spatial.43 ‘The result is a kind of intellectual geometry—the positioning of ideas in 
abstract space—rather than intellectual geography’.44 Michel Foucault might have been 
speaking for intellectual historians specifically (rather than all historians more broadly) 
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Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
42 Sugata Bose, A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006); Bose and Kris Manjapra, eds., 
Cosmopolitan Thought Zones: South Asia and the Global Circulation of Ideas (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Cemil Aydin, The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of 
World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2007); Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of 
Anticolonial Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Nico Slate, Colored 
Cosmopolitanism: The Shared Struggle for Freedom in the United States and India (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
43 Peter Burke, ‘Context in Context,’ Common Knowledge 8 (2002): 152-77; Rita Felski and 
Herbert F. Tucker, eds., ‘Context?,’ New Literary History 42 (2011), vii-xii, 557-756; Peter E. 
Gordon, ‘Contextualism and Criticism in the History of Ideas,’ in this volume. 
44 John Randolph, ‘The Space of Intellect (and the Intellect of Space),’ in this volume. 
- 15 - 
when he declared in an interview: ‘Space was that which was dead, fixed, non-dialectical, 
immobile. On the other hand, time was rich, fertile, vibrant, dialectical.’45 
Space can be understood intensively as well as extensively. In this regard 
historians of science may have much to teach both international historians and intellectual 
historians. A ‘spatial turn’ in the history of science put in doubt the universality of truth 
and insisted upon local knowledge: there could be no view from nowhere when every 
view sprang from somewhere. Ideas emerged from tightly defined spaces, from littoral 
beaches as well as laboratory benches, and from public drinking-houses as well as royal 
academies. When viewed microscopically in this way, the seamless web of abstract 
knowledge turned out to be a brittle mosaic of contingent concerns.46 If one aim of this 
literature was to debunk the presumed universality of scientific reason, another was to 
show just how fragments of knowledge were accumulated and collected and how their 
credibility was secured. ‘We need to understand not only how knowledge is made in 
specific places but also how transactions occur between places’: that is, how ideas travel, 
who transports them, what baggage they carry on their journeys, and how they become 
domesticated and naturalized upon arrival.47  
This approach revealed the intricate mechanisms of information-gathering that 
made scientific knowledge both possible and plausible. Even the most physically isolated 
of thinkers, like the land-locked Isaac Newton who never saw the sea in his life, could 
become a global center of calculation because he commanded a worldwide web of 
correspondents from the Gulf of Tonkin to the Strait of Magellan.48 Corporate bodies 	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such as the Society of Jesus and the English and Dutch East India Companies facilitated 
big science, in the sense of the long-distance production of knowledge.49 And later ‘webs 
of empire’ dissolved distinctions between centers and peripheries as each alleged 
periphery earned a central place in accumulating imperial archives, testing hypotheses, 
and generating ideologies through inter-colonial exchanges.50 In these ways, extensively 
elaborated connections linked intensively cultivated locations to create new maps of 
knowledge and transnational canons through the transmission of ideas and information 
across continents and oceans. 
These studies in what Pierre Bourdieu called the ‘science of international relations 
with regard to culture’ offer more generally replicable models for intellectual history.51 
When conceptions of space expand, webs of significance ramify and networks of 
exchange proliferate to create novel contexts and unanticipated connections among them. 
Shifting patterns of sociability and correspondence, of the distribution of books and the 
spatial organization of knowledge—in rooms and buildings, streets and squares, cities 
and regions, countries and continents, empires and oceans—forced thinkers to reconceive 
the nature of their audiences, the potential impact of their arguments, and the extent of 
their spheres of action. In light of these considerations, to answer the question, ‘What was 
Enlightenment?,’ intellectual historians attuned to space must now ask, ‘Where was 
Enlightenment?’, a question only fully answerable in a global context across the longue 
durée.52 
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Changing conceptions of space expanded the contexts for ideas and, with them, 
the very possibilities for thought. The most familiar example for European intellectual 
historians might be the broader contexts that transoceanic exploration and colonization 
generated for thinkers in early modern Europe, as intercultural encounters and the 
proliferation of empires around the Indian Ocean, the Atlantic world and later the Pacific 
tested conceptions of nature, civilization, political community, property, religious 
diversity, and toleration, among other questions.53 For instance, John Locke, a voracious 
reader of travel literature, confronted instances of diversity and belief and practice drawn 
from accounts of five continents;54 Thomas Hobbes, a more modest consumer of 
Americana, shaped his understanding of international relations by reference to 
ethnographic descriptions of the state of nature;55 and David Hume’s political economy 
owed much to his Atlantic connections.56 As the ‘Great Map of Mankind’ was unrolled 
(in Edmund Burke’s resonant phrase), truly global possibilities for thought opened up for 
the generations of thinkers writing after the mid-eighteenth century—among them 
Diderot, Turgot, Smith, Kant, Herder, Burke, and Bentham—with consequences for their 
constructions of universalism and cosmopolitanism as well as for their conceptions of 
culture and difference.57 Moving into the later nineteenth century, the compression of 
space by technology—above all, the steamship, the railway, and the telegraph—made 	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new forms of political community imaginable over the expanses of empire and across the 
world. Pace Foucault, space was dynamic not static. The contexts for thinking expanded 
to encompass the entire globe. Modern intellectual historians accordingly have to track 
ideas on ever larger scales: continental, inter-regional, transoceanic, and ultimately 
planetary. As Heidegger, Schmitt, and Arendt were among the first to note in the mid-
twentieth century, outer space may be the truly final frontier for intellectual history.58 
 
* * * * * 
 
So far, my account of the international turn in intellectual history has been 
overwhelmingly upbeat, a tour d’horizon of achievements sustained and promises yet to 
be fulfilled. But every silver lining has a cloud. In what ways could the international turn 
possibly be a turn for the worse? This movement has not yet entered the phase of well-
earned auto-critique, nor has it attracted much sustained attention from outsiders. 
However, some charges have already been arrayed against it, among them reification, 
presentism, ‘classism,’ and changing conceptions of context.59 None of these criticisms is 
peculiar to international intellectual history: all are familiar from debates on the history of 
ideas over at least the last half-century. Yet they have all become sharper when 
intellectual history extends over greater expanses of space, as new forms of disjunction 
between ideas and new analytical demands come to the fore. 
Reification is a familiar charge, going back at least as far as the Cambridge 
School’s criticisms of Lovejoy’s history of ideas: what appear to be iterations of the same 
idea turn out to be distinct conceptions in need of disaggregation rather than assimilation 
into broader narratives over time or across space. For example, liberalism in Britain was 	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not the same as liberalism in India: each developed within its own ecological niche, yet 
they did not emerge in ignorance of each other, but rather in dialogues mediated by local 
conditions of the reception, circulation, and hybridization of arguments.60 After at least 
the mid-eighteenth century, the conditions of reception were trans-regional and 
increasingly global: Indian ‘liberals’ in the early nineteenth century like Rammohan Roy 
saw their own struggles against despotism as part of worldwide movements 
encompassing British and Portuguese colonies in Asia, the Spanish monarchy in the 
Atlantic world, and Britain itself. Texts carried ideas but always amid framing paratexts, 
and then into unpredictable contexts for their translation and reappropriation. These 
conditions generated dissimilitude out of similarity, but rarely to the extent of complete 
disjuncture and incomparability. With such caveats in mind, the danger of falling into 
reification may be overblown. With methodological assistance where necessary from, 
say, Rezeptionsgeschichte, the history of the book, and post-colonial theory it should be 
possible to avoid the dangers of an older, less sophisticated, transhistorical history of 
ideas and replace it with a more methodologically robust transtemporal history in ideas.61 
Presentism may offer a more serious danger for the international turn. ‘The whole 
enterprise [of international intellectual history] is itself presentist, in the sense that the 
transnational turn is influenced, in evident respects, by the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first century public controversies over “globalization”.’62 Yet we can no more 
wish away current arguments than we can deny the presence of debates over 
cosmopolitan, universal or global connections and conceptions in the past. It is a 
truism—and, like all truisms, by definition at least partly true—that our ever-changing 
present continually reveals aspects of the past that have been overlooked or 
underappreciated. In this case, as in other aspects of transnational history, two approaches 
are possible: ‘A first would suggest that connections did exist and were known to past 
actors, but have for some reason been forgotten or laid aside. The task of the historian 
would then be to rediscover these lost traces. A second view would instead posit that 	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historians might act as electricians, connecting circuits by acts of imaginative 
reconstitution rather than simple restitution.’63 The first of these approaches—connective 
rather than comparative, reconstitutive rather than restitutive—might be preferable for 
most historians, but the second is also surely necessary for the creation of the requisite 
historical distance between past imperatives and current concerns. We surely delude 
ourselves if we imagine we do not see those concerns through a glass darkly: we will 
only be able to see them more clearly if we place them in long-range perspective. 
‘Classism’—the idea that ‘only the high, or the great, or the highly educated, have 
been the subject, in general, of histories of the individual mind, or the individual self’—is 
a familiar charge against intellectual history, rather than a failing peculiar to intellectual 
history with an international twist.64 J. S. Mill, for one, had rebutted it as early as 1838 in 
his defence of Bentham and Coleridge:  
 
… speculative philosophy, which to the superficial appears a thing so 
remote from the business of life and the outward interests of men, is in 
reality the thing on earth which most influences them, and in the long run 
overbears every other influence save those which it must itself obey. The 
writers of whom we speak have never been read by the multitude; except 
for the more slight of their works, their readers have been few: but they 
have been the teachers of the teachers.65 
 
In between the speculative philosophers and the multitude are the thinkers of what Emma 
Rothschild has called ‘intermediate’ or ‘medium thoughts,’ the reflections of those too 
undistinguished to be the subjects of individual intellectual biography but too profuse in 
leaving their reflective traces to be subsumed into any history of mentalités, especially, 
but not exclusively, those engaged in public policy of various kinds.66 Such people were 	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often globetrotters and go-betweens, members of the massive Asian, European, and 
African migrations that crossed (and re-crossed) the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and the 
steppes, but also the intercultural agents who trafficked in local knowledge and the 
creation of ‘global intelligence’.67 As historians reconstruct their forms of intellection, 
and the histories of their ideas, we can expect to find even more widespread evidence of 
forms of transnational thinking than ever before.68 
The increasingly elastic definitions of context demanded by transnational history 
should not deter intellectual historians. Some are beginning to ask how precisely can any 
idea can be understood ‘in context’ if context is now defined to encompass 
intercontinental communications, multilingual communities, or the expansion of world 
systems?69 Here again the opportunities may be greater than the dangers. Canons of 
relevance must be defined, routes of active (or at least plausible) transmission mapped, 
and scales of reference calibrated according to contemporaries’ conceptions of the 
international or the global; with such boundaries in place, it should be feasible to 
reconstruct meaningful spatial contexts for the ideas we trace across borders and bounded 
discursive communities. 
Historicizing conceptions of space—of the national, the international, the 
transnational, and the global—may in fact be the implied agenda for intellectual history 
after the international turn, just as historicizing conceptions of time was a major project 
for intellectual history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This agenda leads 
inexorably to the question what it might mean for intellectual history to take a global 
turn. Quite what a global intellectual history would comprise, or even what its subject-
matter will be, is still far from clear, though vigorous debate has already begun about 
these matters.70 Whether the global turn is just one logical extension of the international 	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turn or a distinct endeavor in its own right remains to be seen. With such widening 
horizons and enticing prospects, it surely cannot be premature to welcome both the 
international and the global as turns for the better in intellectual history, as they have 
been for historical writing tout court. 
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